Volume 9

Issue 2

Article 12

1964

Corporations - Proxy Regulations - Federal Courts Can Grant
Complete Relief in Shareholder's Suit for Violation of Section
14(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Jack J. Bernstein

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jack J. Bernstein, Corporations - Proxy Regulations - Federal Courts Can Grant Complete Relief in
Shareholder's Suit for Violation of Section 14(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 9 Vill. L. Rev. 330
(1964).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol9/iss2/12

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

330

Bernstein: Corporations
- Proxy Regulations - Federal Courts Can Grant Compl
VILLANOVA LAW
REVIEW

[VOL. 9

requirements of the tax law. What the effects of this form will be in fields
other than taxation is for the state courts to decide under their own
corporate law. Alleigro determined a problem similar to the one involved

here by one method. The court in the instant case found it unnecessary
to go so far and determined the answer by viewing the fiduciary duties of
the parties involved. This appears to be the simpler method, and the
24
result seems correct.
Conrad J. DeSantis

CORPORATIONS-PROXY

REGULATIONS- FEDERAL

COURTS

CAN

GRANT COMPLETE RELIEF IN SHAREHOLDER'S SUIT FOR VIOLATION
OF SECTION

14(a)

OF SECURITIES EXCHANGE

ACT OF

1934.

Borak v. J. I. Case Co. (7th Cir. 1963)
Plaintiff, the owner of 2,000 shares of J. I. Case Company stock,
brought a private suit in the federal district court to have a merger between
Case and the American Tractor Corporation declared illegal and void. He
also sought to have Case and its directors enjoined from taking any action
to consummate the plan. Injunctive relief was denied on both the original
complaint and a subsequent amended complaint. The district court decided
that only a derivative cause of action arose for violation of section 14(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 on which the amended complaint was
based and that under this section only declaratory relief could be granted.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that a private right
of action did exist under section 14(a) and that section 27 of the act 2 gave
24. It is interesting to note that the court's decision means Central's potential
share of the tax saving in the form of dividends would still be $3,060,573.60. It would
seem the additional investment of $1,000,000, even without the disproportionate allocation agreement, is an extremely lucrative one and makes Central's duty to its stockholders and to Mahoning, clear.
1. It shall be unlawful for any person, by use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of any national securities
exchange or otherwise to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any
proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an
exempted security) registered on any national securities exchange in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Securities and Exchange Act, § 14(a), 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. 78n(a) (1958).
2. The district courts of the United States . . . and the United States courts
of any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and
regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to
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the federal courts jurisdiction to award to the plaintiff whatever relief the
merits of the controversy required. Borak v. J. I. Case Co., 317 F.2d 838
(7th Cir. 1963).
The issues in controversy are whether a private cause of action arises
from a violation of the proxy rules of the Securities Exchange Act, and if
so, whether a plaintiff is entitled to more than declaratory relief for such
violation. Prior to 1961 there was an apparent trend toward granting a
private cause of action for violation of section 14(a) of the act, 3 but it was
not until Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp.4 that a federal court stated
conclusively that such a private cause of action did exist.
The basis of implied liabilities giving rise to this private action is the
common-law tort doctrine which bases a private action on the violation of
a statute. For this doctrine to be applicable, however, the invaded interest
must be that which the enactment was intended to protect. 5 In the
ordinary case where the statute makes no mention of a civil remedy, "the
obvious conclusion is that the legislature either did not have the civil action
in mind at all, or deliberately omitted to provide for it." 6 This, however,
cannot be said to prove whether or not there was the intention to create a
private right in this situation. 7 The Securities and Exchange Commission
has argued, as amicus curiae, that a private right should exist under section
10(b) and the proxy rules,8 and it appears that the court's decision in
Dann was the logical culmination of the trend that had been established in
prior cases, and thus upheld the true intent of the statute.9
The court in Dann, however, refused to grant all of the relief for which
the plaintiff asked, holding that since the act regulates proxy solicitations
prior to the corporate election under section 14(a), the federal court had
no power to grant retroactive relief.' 0 "The obvious purpose of section
14(a)," as the court in the instant case argues, "is the protection of the
right of shareholders to a full and fair disclosure of all material facts
which affect corporate election by proxy. For the achievement of that
purpose, the jurisdiction conferred by section 27 must be broad enough to
effectively protect that right."" If the court's statement of the purpose of
the section is correct, it's conclusion as to construction would seem to be
enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder....
(Emphasis added.)
Securities and Exchange Act, § 27, 48 Stat. 902 (1934), as amended, § 127, 63 Stat.
107 (1949), 15 U.S.C. 78aa (1958).
3. For a more complete history of the law in this area prior to Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961), see Loss, The SEC Proxy Rifles
in the Courts, 73 HARv. L. Rtv. 1041, 1045-58 (1960) ; 62 COLUm. L. REv. 375 (1962);
75 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1962) ; 7 VILL. L. Rzv. 125 (1961).
4. Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., supra note 3.
5. Loss, supra note 3' at 1044.
6. PROSSER, TORTS 153 (2d ed. 1955).
7. Loss, supra note 3, at 1054.
8. Phillips v. United Corp., 5 S.E.C. 758, 764 (1948), appeal dismissed sub noin.
Phillips v. SEC, 171 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1948).
9. 7 VILL. L. Riv. 125, 128 (1961).
10. Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961).
11. Borak v. J. I. Case Co., 317 F.2d 838, 848 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. granted
sub nom., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 375 U.S. 901, 84 S.Ct. 195 (1963) (No. 402).
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well founded, and it's divergence from the limitation of Dann justified.
Construing a similar grant under the Securities Act of 1933,12 the
Supreme Court gave added force to this court's determination when it
held that jurisdiction to "enforce" included the power to utilize any remedy
to which the parties would normally be entitled.13 Injunction here would
seem to be within the bounds of that principle.
The Supreme Court in Bell v. Hood,14 held that the federal courts
have the power, under a general grant of jurisdiction, to enforce a federal
statute and to grant all of the relief which may be commensurate with the
effective enforcement of the statute and the protection of rights thereby
created, notwithstanding the failure of the statute to specify the remedies
which may be employed. Section 27 has often been construed in conjunction
with section 10(b) as enabling courts to award damages and retrospective
relief. 15 By a parity of reasoning the same result is demanded here.
If the federal courts refuse to grant any relief other than a declaratory
judgment, a plaintiff must necessarily look to the state courts for further
satisfaction. It is possible that the state court could refuse to assume
jurisdiction ;16 a cause of action might not lie since there may have been
no violation of state law, no common-law tort action, or violation of
contractual right. Even if an action does lie in the state courts the result
would nevertheless be cumbersome. The plaintiff would be forced to
prosecute two suits at added expense and inconvenience. If there were no
action in the state court, he would find himself possessing what might be
a valueless declaratory judgment.
Simply stated the problem is this: federal law has prohibited certain
acts which have injured the plaintiff. To declare these acts illegal, leaving
all other relief to be given by the state courts, is only half a remedy. The
situation could not be more ripe for the federal court to evoke the principles
of judicial economy and provide the plaintiff with full and adequate relief.
If the court does not grant the complete relief requested, consideration of
state law will be necessary to determine the proper remedy for violation
of a federal right. It hardly seems in line with these principles of economy
for the federal court to follow this procedure and increase not only the
expense of justice to the plaintiff, but also the amount of pending litigation
in the courts. 17 The action should be considered to be purely federal in
12. Securities Act, § 22(a), 48 Stat. 86 (1933), 15 U.S.C. 77v(a) (1958).
13. Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 61 S.Ct. 229 (1940)

accord, SEC v. Fiscal Fund, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 712 (D. Del. 1943).
14. 327 U.S. 678, 684, 66 S.Ct. 773, 777 (1946).

15. E.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Hooper v. Mountain

States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814, 81 S.Ct.
695 (1961) ; Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Kohler v. Kohler Co.,
208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962).

16. See Investment Associates, Inc. v. Standard Power & Light Corp., 29 Del.
Ch. 225, 48 A.2d 501 (Ch. 1946), aff'd, 29 Del. Ch. 593, 51 A.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
17. See Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 53 S.Ct. 586 (1933) ; cf. Bank of the
United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. 904 (1824). See generally 3 Loss, S4CURIriiS
REGUIATION

2031-32 (1961).
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its governing law, as would be an injunctive action brought by the Commission itself under the proxy rules.
If the Dann case was correct in it's holding that the same causes of
action are open to a private individual as are open to the Commission 18
it would seem logically to follow, as at least one authority has stated, that
similar remedies should be granted regardless of who brings the action. 19
It has been held that the trial court "possesses the authority to make any
order necessary to enforce liabilities or duties created by the Act or
rules.... 20 Once the violation of the federal right is established, Bell v.

Hood,21 makes it clear that the federal courts may use any available remedy
to vindicate that right. To render complete justice, a federal court should
bring into play the full scope of its equity powers, go beyond the immediate
claim on which its jurisdiction is predicated and give whatever relief the
22
exigencies of the case may demand.
Though complete justice to a plaintiff would alone seem to justify the
result reached by the court here, federal policy must also be considered.
Under section 27 the federal courts have been granted exclusive jurisdiction
over violations of the proxy sections of the act. One of the purposes of
this grant must certainly have been to maintain uniformity in the enforcement of the act, that is, to insure that all plaintiffs and all defendants in
similar situations were accorded the same treatment. The standards of
relief for similar causes of actions in the various states would no doubt
vary considerably. Thus to grant only declaratory relief, leaving additional
remedies to the state courts and state law, would destroy the desired
uniformity. To construe the act so narrowly may leave the plaintiff in one
state with a federal right without an adequate remedy and another plaintiff
in a different state with a full remedy. This could well serve to weaken the
act and, in effect, defeat Congress' apparent purpose in giving the federal
courts exclusive jurisdiction under section 27. They would have exclusive
jurisdiction, but could do little justice with it. The state courts would, in
all practical considerations, be the only ones capable of granting total
relief, and this would in practice, if not in theory, actually usurp the power
granted to the federal courts by Congress under the act. Therefore, it
appears that the court in this case has wisely taken the step toward complete
justice that Dann refused to take. Its decision, if followed, will unquestionably serve to strengthen the act and accomplish the purposes for
which it was established.
Jack J. Bernstein
18. Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961).
19. Loss, supra note 3, at 1068.
20. SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 847, 68 S.Ct. 351 (1948).
21. 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773 (1946).
22. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 327 U.S. 395, 401-03, 66 S.Ct. 1086, 1090-91
(1946); see Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 80 S.Ct. 332
(1960).
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